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Thompson v. Thompson: The Jurisdictional Dilemma
of Child Custody Cases Under the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act
I. INTRODUCTION
An estimated 25,000 to 100,000 children are "snatched" or "kid-
napped" each year by a parent who seeks to gain a favorable custody
decree from one state after losing the custody battle in another
state.1 The new forum state, not bound by the judgment of the prior
state since child custody determinations are subject to modification
when changed circumstances affect the best interests of the child,
would often award custody to the snatching parent.2 As a result, the
snatching parent would have a valid custody award in one jurisdic-
tion even though the prior custody decree in favor of the other par-
ent was still valid in the previous jurisdiction.3
In an effort to deal with the problem of conflicting custody judg-
ments, many states enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA).4 These states sought to avoid jurisdictional conflicts
by establishing uniform standards which allowed an adopting state to
1. These figures reflect the estimated number per year of children "snatched" or
"kidnapped" by a parent as of the time the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act was
enacted. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 517 (1988); see Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Jus-
tice of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Develop-
ment of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1980) [hereinafter PKPA Hearing] (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop). The Library
of Congress estimated the lower figure and Children's Rights, Inc. estimated the
higher figure. Id.
2. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
3. Often times, such conflicting judgments cause each parent to try to obtain
physical custody of the child in order to bring the child into the state in which the
favorable custody decree has been entered. See Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gil-
lard, 203 Pa. Super. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964) (mother, who had a valid custody decree in
Pennsylvania, resnatched the child from the father, who had obtained a valid decree in
California); see also In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966)
(mother resnatched daughter in order to obtain an Arizona decree when the father re-
fused to relinquish the child after a visit pursuant to visitation rights in Texas, where
he later was awarded full custody).
4. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. AcT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 116-70 (1979) [hereinafter
UCCJA]. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1968.
determine whether it had jurisdiction over the matter.5 The stan-
dards also imposed an obligation upon other states to recognize and
enforce the out-of-state decrees.6 Dissatisfaction, though, arose when
some states did not enact the UCCJA and others enacted variations.7
Congress, in recognizing that uniformity was needed to prevent fo-
rum shopping by a parent seeking a favorable custody award, passed
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).8 The PKPA es-
tablishes requirements which must be satisfied before a state court
has sufficient jurisdiction to hear the matter 9 and imposes a duty
upon "every State [to] enforce according to its terms . . .any child
custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this
section by a court of another State."'10 Furthermore, once a state ex-
ercises jurisdiction pursuant to the Act, no other state can assume ju-
risdiction over the child custody case."
The issue which arises is whether a federal court is a proper forum
to enforce the provisions of the PKPA when one state improperly ex-
ercises jurisdiction under the Act and enters a custody decree which
conflicts with a prior custody award of another state. Since the
PKPA is silent with regard to this issue, the Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Thompson 12 addressed whether the PKPA creates an
implied cause of action in the federal courts to determine the validity
of one custody decree over another.1s In Thompson, the Court unani-
mously held that no such cause of action exists; thus, the federal
courts cannot determine whether a state court has acted in compli-
ance with the PKPA.14
In this note, the historical problems associated with according full
faith and credit to child custody determinations will first be dis-
cussed. Additionally, the UCCJA and the PKPA will be examined,
with an emphasis on how these legislative solutions have attempted
to deal with the full faith and credit problem of child custody cases.
Finally, the Supreme Court's opinion in Thompson will be analyzed
5. UCCJA § 3. See inkfra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
6. UCCJA § 13. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
7. See Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 517 (1988); see also PKPA Hearing,
supra note 1, at 144 (statement of Prof. Coombs).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
9. Id. § 1738A(c). See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).
11. Id. § 1738A(g). "A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any pro-
ceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding
in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdic-
tion consistently with the provisions of this section .... Id
12. 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
13. Id. at 516.
14. Id. See infra notes 94-126 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia wrote a con-
curring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined in part.
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and the the impact this decision will have on the PKPA and future
child custody cases will be considered.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Full Faith and Credit and Child Custody Decrees
Article IV, section one of the United States Constitution provides:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."' 5 Congress, using this constitutionally mandated authority,
enacted legislation which not only provides that the legislative acts,
records and judicial proceedings of the states shall be authenticated,' 6
but also requires that "[s]uch Acts, records and judicial proceedings
... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."17
The Supreme Court has been confronted with the applicability of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to child custody cases three times.'8
In each case, the Court reserved judgment on whether the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is applicable to a child custody decision made by
another state.' 9 The reason for the Court's abstention with regard to
this issue is that even if the Clause was applicable, a state is only re-
quired to give the same effect to the custody determination as would
be given in the state which entered the decree.2 0 In other words, an-
other state "has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment,
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
17. Id.
18. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (South Carolina court awarded custody to the
mother after a Virginia decree entered judgment in favor of the father); Kovacs v.
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (North Carolina, ignoring a New York decree granting cus-
tody to the mother, found that the best interest of the child would be served if the
paternal grandfather retained custody); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947) (New
York court modified the custody decree of Florida which granted liberal visitation
rights to the father, while awarding custody, as did the Florida court, to the mother).
19. Halvey, 330 U.S. at 616 (reserved decision on "whether the State which has ju-
risdiction over the child may, regardless of a custody decree rendered by another State,
make such orders concerning custody as the welfare of the child from time to time re-
quires"); see Kovacs, 356 U.S. at 607 ("Whatever effect the Full Faith and Credit
Clause may have with respect to custody decrees .... "); see also Ford, 371 U.S. at 192.
20. Halvey, 330 U.S. at 614. The Court stated, "[A] judgment has no constitutional
claim to a more conclusive or final effect in the State of the forum than it has in the
State where rendered." Id,
to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was ren-
dered."21 Thus, since a state usually will retain the right to modify a
custody decree due to changed circumstances which affect the best
interests of the child, the courts of another state also have the right
to modify that custody decree. 22
Because of this judicial freedom to modify child custody decrees, an
unsuccessful parent had an incentive to take the child into another
jurisdiction with the hope that the new forum would use its discre-
tion to modify the judgment. Naturally, problems arise because:
individuals who are unsuccessful (or who expect to be unsuccessful) in an ac-
tion in one state will attempt to evade that state's jurisdiction by taking the
child to another state and relitigating the custody issue there. The second
state will often switch custody to the parent within its jurisdiction, thereby
encouraging 'child snatching' by rewarding the de facto physical custodian
notwithstanding the existence of an order or decree to the contrary. 23
This created an obvious anomaly because each parent had a valid cus-
tody award in a different jurisdiction. Consequently, doubt arose as
to which award superseded the other, not only as far as other states
were concerned, but also with regard to the parent who no longer re-
tained physical custody.
B. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws attempted to deal with the problem of conflicting custody de-
crees in the state courts by promulgating the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.24 The UCCJA is intended to remedy the conflict
which arises among the states with regard to child custody cases by
creating uniform standards for establishing jurisdiction and providing
for recognition and enforcement of out-of-state decrees.2 5 The
21. Id. at 615.
22. Ford, 371 U.S. at 191 n.2 (citation omitted).
23. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Addendum to Joint Hearing on
S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1980) [hereinafter PKPA Addendum] (let-
ter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to Rep. Peter Rodino).
24. UCCJA §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 116-70 (1979).
25. UCCJA § 1. Some of the stated general purposes are as follows:
1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody...;
2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a cus-
tody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the in-
terest of the child;
5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody awards;
7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
Id.
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UCCJA thus was a conscious effort to remedy the inherent defects of
a child custody award.
The UCCJA establishes strict guidelines that a state must adhere
to when asserting jurisdiction over child custody matters.26 One of
the following four criteria must be met before a state court can assert
jurisdiction over a child custody case:
(1) The state is the home state of the child at the time of the proceeding (or
the home state within six months prior to the proceeding and the child was
removed from the state for purposes of obtaining custody);2 7
(2) it is in the best interests of the child because the child and at least one
parent have a significant connection with the state and there exists substantial
evidence in that state as to the child's care and training;28
(3) the child is physically present and has been either abandoned, or sub-
jected to or threatened with abuse or mistreatment;29 or
(4) no other state can or will assert jurisdiction and it is in the best interest of
the child for the present forum to do so.3 0
Although there are four independent bases for a state court to assert
jurisdiction over the matter, the first two critera, under which mere.
physical presence of the child is insufficient to confer jurisdiction,31
are the major bases for a court to assert jurisdiction.32 Furthermore,
this section expressly points out that "[p]hysical presence of the
child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to deter-
mine his custody." 33 Thus, a parent would be unable to establish ju-
risdiction merely because the child has been successfully removed
from another jurisdiction and is presently accompanied by the parent
in the new forum.
Not only are jurisdictional standards tightened, but the UCCJA
also establishes stringent standards for the modification of a custody
decree of another state. In order to prevent forum shopping and to
26. Id, § 3.
27. Id § 3(a)(1). Home state is defined as:
the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecu-
tive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods
of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the
6-month or other period.
iM § 2(5).
28. Id § 3(a)(2).
29. Id § 3(a)(3).
30. Id § 3(a)(4).
31. Id § 3(b). This section provides that "physical presence in this State of the
child... is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a
child custody determination."
32. Id § 3 (1979) (Commissioners' Note).
33. Id § 3(c).
stabilize the child custody arrangement,3 4 the UCCJA declares:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of [the present]
state shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of this
State that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction
under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or
has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of
this State has jurisdiction.3 5
In other words, a state may only modify an existing out-of-state cus-
tody decree if the state which entered the decree no longer has com-
petent jurisdiction under the UCCJA or refuses to exercise
continuing jurisdiction. It is therefore the intent of this section for
"states [to] defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the court of another
state as long as that state has jurisdiction under the standards of this
Act."36
The UCCJA also addresses the issue of whether a judgment by one
state is binding on another state court,3 7 and whether such a decision
should be recognized and enforced in another state.38 Section 12 of
34. Id § 14 (Commissioners' Note).
35. Id § 14(a). A flaw under section 14 is that the new forum state determines
whether the state which entered the original custody decree continues to have jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the new forum state, which satisfies the "home state" requirement, might
argue that the prior state no longer retains jurisdiction over the matter even though
there still may be sufficient evidence within the decree-entering state to satisfy the
"best interest" criteria. See Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 341 N.W.2d 307 (1983). In
Mace, the Nebraska court, the "home state" of the children, determined it was a more
appropriate forum to assert jurisdiction and modify a Mississippi custody decree even
though there was evidence of a significant connection between Mississippi and the fa-
ther and children. An alternative solution to the problem of concurrent jurisdiction
would be to allow the decree-entering state to make the determination of whether it
retained jurisdiction, thus eliminating the potential problem of another state asserting
more "appropriate" jurisdiction over the matter.
36. UCCJA § 14 (Commissioners' Note). Section 8(b) also seeks to remedy the
problem of state courts modifying another state's custody decree, which would en-
courage a losing parent to snatch the child in order to obtain custody:
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its ju-
risdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without
consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child
from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly
retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical
custody ....
UCCJA § 8(b).
37. Id. § 12.
A custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction
under section 3 binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified
in accordance with section 5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these par-
ties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided
and as to the custody determination made unless and until that determination
is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this Act.
Id, 1
38. Id. § 13.
The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification
decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statu-
tory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act,
[Vol. 16: 409, 1989] Thompson v. Thompson
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the UCCJA provides the basis whereby a custody decree can be rec-
ognized and enforced by another state in that it addresses the prob-
lem of a child custody case being subject to modification and thus not
sufficiently final to invoke the doctrine of res judicata.3 9 Therefore,
even though "a child custody decree is normally subject to modifica-
tion in the interest of the child... as long as it has not been modi-
fied, it is as binding as a final judgment ... ,"40 Furthermore, the
UCCJA bypasses the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which according
to the Supreme Court does not require a state to recognize an out-of-
state custody decree,41 by establishing that as a matter of state law
out-of-state custody decrees should be recognized and enforced.42 Ir-
respective of the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
UCCJA thus obligates those states which have adopted the Act to
give full faith and credit to an out-of-state custody decree as a final
adjudication of the matter so long as the decree has not been
modified.
Even though the UCCJA dealt with the peculiar problem of the
lack of recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees,
its effectiveness was limited since it was subjected to voluntary adop-
tion by the states. Uniformity was needed for. the UCCJA's provi-
sions to be effective. That is, so long as one state had not adopted the
UCCJA, or had adopted it even with significant alterations, the prob-
lem of child snatching for the purpose of forum shopping still ex-
isted. By the end of April 1979, only thirty-two states had adopted
the UCCJA,43 and many had enacted variations which destroyed the
uniformity that was essential to eliminate forum shopping.44
so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional
standards substantially similar to those of this Act.
Id.
39. UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. 149-50 (1979) (Commissioners' Note). Section 12 "deals
with the intra-state validity of custody decrees which provides the basis for their inter-
state recognition and enforcement .... Id.
40. Id.
41. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
42. UCCJA § 13 (Commissioners' Note).
43. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Child and Human Development of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1979) (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop). It should be noted that
by 1983, three years after the enactment of the PKPA, all fifty states and the District
of Columbia had adopted the UCCJA in some form. 9 U.L.A. 31-32 (Supp. 1988).
44. PKPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 144 (statement of Prof. Coombs). Compare
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2115(a) (Supp. 1988) (substitutes "or" for "and" between
subsections 1 and 2 of section 15) with supra note 35 and accompanying text. The Illi-
nois statute allows an Illinois court to modify an existing judgment of another state if
the Illinois court merely had jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA without regard to
The UCCJA also does not address situations where two state
courts construe their respective provisions of the UCCJA differently.
In Webb v. Webb,45 the Supreme Court was confronted with a Flor-
ida court grant of custody to the mother and a Georgia court award of
custody to the father even though both states had adopted the
UCCJA.46 Although the two state courts had entered different cus-
tody decrees based on their respective interpretations of the UCCJA,
the Supreme Court abstained from determining which decree was
valid since the issue required the interpretation of state law.47
Therefore, a state can enter a judgment which conflicts with another
state's custody decree by merely interpreting the UCCJA differently.
Furthermore, the losing party has no power to contest this interpre-
tation of state law outside of that state's courts.
C. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
In recognition of the unsatisfactory results of the UCCJA, the in-
consistent and conflicting custody decisions by the states, and the
continuing problem of child snatching by the losing parent hoping to
find a hospitable forum,48 Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA).49 The general purposes of the PKPA are to
promote cooperation between state courts,50 to facilitate the enforce-
ment of out-of-state custody decrees,51 to discourage interstate con-
troversies over child custody,52  and to "avoid jurisdictional
competition and conflict between State courts in matters of child cus-
tody ... .,"53
whether the prior state still retained jurisdiction. This change in the Illinois statute
thus provides the incentive for a parent to attempt to satisfy one of Illinois' jurisdic-
tional requirements in order to modify the judgment, irrespective of whether the prior
state still maintained the requisite jurisdiction pursuant to the Act.
45. 451 U.S. 493 (1981). In Webb, Florida assumed jurisdiction as the home state of
the child and asserted that Georgia no longer had sufficient contact with the parties to
assert jurisdiction. The Georgia court believed that it had jurisdiction since the father
obtained custody of the child in an emergency situation created by the mother. Webb
v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 651, 266 S.E.2d 463, 464 (1980). See supra notes 27-35 and accom-
panying text.
46. Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 494 (1981). The mother filed for an injunction in
the Florida court to enforce the original Georgia decree. While that case was pending
the father retrieved the child and filed a complaint in Georgia to modify the original
decree. Thus, the two courts later entered conflicting judgments. See Webb, 245 Ga.
650, 266 S.E.2d 463 (1980).
47. Webb, 451 U.S. at 497-99.
48. Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes for Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(1), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (1980) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
50. Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes for Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-611, § 7(c)(1), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (1980).
51. Id § 7(c)(3).
52. Id. § 7(c)(4).
53. Id. § 7(c)(5).
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The PKPA begins by stating that "[t]he appropriate authorities of
every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify
except as provided in subsection (f) ... any child custody determina-
tion made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court
of another State."54 The PKPA therefore requires that one state give
full faith and credit to another state's custody decree if the state
which issued the decree did so in compliance with the Act.
For a state court to render a child custody determination which is
consistent with the PKPA, that court must have jurisdiction under
its own state laws and satisfy one of the conditions specified by the
Act.55 The conditions set forth are nearly identical to the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the UCCJA.56 These conditions are: the court
sits in the home state of the child; the best interests of the child are
served because there is a significant connection with the state and
substantial evidence within the state concerning the child's welfare;
the child is abandoned or mistreated within the state; and no other
state has jurisdiction or another state declines to exercise jurisdic-
tion.57 The major difference from the UCCJA with regard to the ju-
risdictional requirements is that the PKPA provides express
preference to the home state of the child.5s Thus, if a conflict arises
as to which PKPA jurisdictional requirement is to be satisfied, the
home state of the child takes precedence.
The PKPA also addresses the unique situation of a child custody
case being subject to modification at a future date. Three separate
provisions attempt to solve the problem of two state courts asserting
concurrent jurisdiction in order to modify the original decree. First,
the state court which issued the decree continues to have jurisdiction
over the matter if it still maintains jurisdiction under state law and if
that state is the residence of a parent or the child.59 Second, another
state court cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the matter if
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).
55. Id. § 1738A(c).
56. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (1982).
58. Id, § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i). Under the UCCJA, a court could exercise jurisdiction,
in spite of the child's home state, if another condition could be met, such as a substan-
tial connection with the state or evidence of physical abuse. See UCCJA §3, 9 U.L.A.
123 (1979) (Commissioners' Note).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982).
The jurisdiction of a court of a state which has made a child custody determi-
nation consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the
requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
the first state retains and exercises jurisdiction as provided by the
PKPA.60 Finally, a court of one state with jurisdiction over the case
may modify a custody award entered by another state only if the
other state no longer has jurisdiction or refuses to exercise continu-
ing jurisdiction.61 The PKPA therefore establishes uniform guide-
lines for determining whether a state court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over a child custody case in order to modify the decree
entered by another state.
D. Conflicting State Decrees Under the PKPA
The PKPA provides explicit provisions for determining the appro-
priate state court to exercise jurisdiction in a child custody matter;
however, it is silent as to situations where one state improperly exer-
cises jurisdiction and issues a custody decree conflicting with a decree
properly awarded by another state. That is, "under the rules defined
by § 1738A, if two states concurrently render custody decrees, one
state has asserted jurisdiction in violation of federal law." 62 While
the PKPA does note that "[t]he appropriate authorities of every
State shall enforce according to its terms.., any child custody deter-
mination" 63 made by another state, it does not expressly state a
course of action in the event that two states exercise concurrent ju-
risdiction irrespective of the PKPA.
The question thus arises whether the federal courts may be used to
determine which of two conflicting states is exercising proper juris-
diction under the PKPA. The circuits are split as to whether the fed-
eral courts are an appropriate arena to address the issue of
conflicting custody decrees by two states. The Eleventh, Fifth and
Third Circuits have held that a federal court can determine which of
two conflicting states properly exercised jurisdiction under the Act.64
However, before Thompson, the Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits in dicta stated that the federal courts could not be used to
resolve a conflict between states concerning a child custody decree.6 5
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (1982). See supra note 11.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1982).
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if (1) it has jurisdiction to make such a
child custody determination; and (2) the court of the other State no longer has
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination.
Id.
62. Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1984).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).
64. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1986); Heartfield v. Heartfield,
749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Diruggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984); Flood
v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
65. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that PKPA does not
expressly prohibit federal jurisdiction as a matter of policy); Bennett v. Bennett, 682
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Federal court involvement when two states issue conflicting cus-
tody decrees under the PKPA was first upheld in Flood v. Braaten.66
In Mood, after noting that the language of the PKPA did not provide
any assistance, the court stated that even though Congress did not
want the federal courts to make custody determinations or enforce
custody decrees in the first instance, Congress did create a body of
federal law which addressed the problem of conflicting state custody
decisions.67
By enacting one set of rules binding all the states, Congress sought to elimi-
nate the inconsistency and close the loopholes that encouraged child snatching
under the old system in which each state exercised unreviewable power to
modify decrees. Absent some tribunal capable of enjoining violations of the
strict and uniform requirements of § 1738A, the Congressional policy underly-
ing the enactment would be thwarted. 6 8
The court believed that Congress must have intended the federal
courts to be used when conflicting state custody awards are entered
because to do otherwise would "render § 1738A virtually nugatory by
so restricting the availability of a federal forum that state compliance
with the legislation would become optional."69 In allowing federal
courts to resolve conflicting decrees, other circuits have substantially
adhered to the rationale of .Food.70
Two circuits have stated that the federal courts should not be used
to resolve conflicts among the states under the PKPA, reasoning that
if these matters were intended to be addressed in the federal courts,
Congress would have expressly provided for such a cause of action.71
These courts based their conclusions on two grounds. First, the fed-
eral courts typically are not as competent to handle this area of do-
F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that PKPA is silent as to whether federal
courts have any role in child custody determinations).
66. 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984) (New Jersey state court awarded custody to the
mother, while a North Dakota court awarded custody to the father).
67. Id. at 310.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 312.
70. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1475 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that "an ac-
tion seeking an authoritative federal construction of section 1738A to resolve a conflict
concerning the validity of conflicting state court custody orders may be maintained in
federal district court"); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1985). In
Heartfield, the court determined: "When the courts of two states assert that they have
jurisdiction over a custody determination, it is clear that Congress' purpose in enacting
the Act would be thwarted without some means of determining which state"has the
right to exercise its jurisdiction under the terms of the Act." Id.
71. See supra note 66. It should be noted that Lloyd did not involve conflicting
state decrees, but rather a custody decree in favor of the father issued in Maryland
which he sought to enforce in Wisconsin. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 489, 490 (7th
Cir. 1982).
mestic relations as the state courts, which have traditionally
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.72 Second, the leg-
islative history of the PKPA suggests that "Congress deliberately and
emphatically omitted such a role." 73 Therefore, if Congress had in-
tended the federal courts to address conflicting custody decrees, it
would have expressly stated this intent.
III. THOMPSON V. THOMPSON
A. Facts of the Case
In July 1978, respondent (Susan Thompson) filed for a divorce
from petitioner (David Thompson) in Los Angeles Superior Court.
She also sought to obtain custody of their son Matthew.7 4 The
Thompsons were initially awarded joint custody of Matthew.75 In
November of 1980, Susan, planning a move to Louisiana, was awarded
sole custody of the child without prejudice.7 6 The court also ordered
an investigator to review the custody issues of the case. 77 Susan
moved to Louisiana in December 1980; in March 1981, she sought to
enforce the California custody decree in a Louisiana state court and
obtain a modification of David's visitation privileges. 78 Her petition
was granted in Louisiana in April 1981.79 Meanwhile, after reviewing
the report of the court investigator, the California court retained ju-
risdiction over the matter and awarded sole custody to the boy's fa-
ther in June 1981.80
In August 1981, David filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California in which he sought
an injunction against the Louisiana decree and a declaratory judg-
ment that the California decree was valid.8 ' The district court dis-
missed the complaint for lack of subject matter and personal
72. Id. at 492; see also Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
73. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1043.
74. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 515 (1988).
75. Id.
76. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1986), off'd, 108 S. Ct.
513 (1988). It is not clear from the record who actually filed this motion in the Califor-
nia court. Id. at 1548 n.1.
77. Id. at 1549. This report was to be submitted by April 1981.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Since California retained jurisdiction over the matter, and David still lived
in California, the California court's jurisdiction continued pursuant to section (d) of
the PKPA, and thus Louisiana improperly modified the custody arrangement under
section (f). Furthermore, since the California court's final determination may have
been construed to be pending until the investigator's report, Louisiana also improperly
exercised jurisdiction over the matter under section (g). See supra notes 60-62 and ac-
companying text.
81. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1549 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
513 (1988).
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jurisdiction.82 David appealed the dismissal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.8 3 The court found that the
district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction8 4 be-
cause Susan had the requisite minimum contacts with California to
establish personal jurisdiction.8 5 Furthermore, the court determined
that the case raised a sufficient federal question so as to confer sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.8 6
After determining that the PKPA did apply to the case, the court
addressed whether a claim was stated upon which relief could be
granted.87 The court examined the language, legislative history, and
context of the PKPA and concluded that Congress did not intend to
create a federal cause of action to enforce the Act's terms.88 The
Ninth Circuit stated that "the problem identified by Congress was
not the absence of a federal cause of action, but lack of uniform stan-
dards governing assertion of jurisdiction over child custody matters
by state courts."8 9 According to the court, Congress had rejected a
proposal for enforcement of the PKPA in a federal forum.90 The
court of appeals, in conclusion, stated that "[a]bsent a clear command
from Congress, the longstanding prohibition against federal court in-
82. Id.
83. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 513
(1988).
84. Id. at 1549-50.
85. Id. Susan's marital domicile and dissolution of the marriage took place in Cali-
fornia; Matthew was born in California, and the custody order was a California judg-
ment. Furthermore, "she invoked the benefits and protections afforded by California
law by initiating an action for dissolution and child custody." Id, at 1549.
86. Id. at 1550. The court stated that the failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is not the same as dismissing the case for lack of subject matter juris-
diction; the former is an adjudication on the merits whereas the latter is not. I&
87. Id. at 1550-51. The major issue with regard to whether the PKPA applied to
the present case depended on what date the Act became effective. The court con-
cluded that the enactment date, December 28, 1980, was the date on which section
1738A became effective, and therefore was applicable to the conflicting Louisiana and
California decrees which were entered after that date. I&
88. Id. at 1552-54.
89. Id. at 1554.
90. Id. at 1557-58. The court argued that the "colloquy" between Congressmen
Fish and Conyers demonstrated that Congress did address the issue of enforcement of
this Act in the federal courts but actually favored leaving the enforcement of this full
faith and credit proposal with regard to child custody cases to the states. Id. As the
dissenting opinion pointed out, however, this colloquy "reflects an intent by qongress
not to eliminate the judicially created 'domestic relations' exception to diversity juris-
diction by enacting 1738A. Specifically, Congressman Fish proposed to amend 28
U.S.C. § 1332 to authorize diversity jurisdiction in custody cases and to eliminate the
$10,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement." Id. at 1560 (Alarcon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
volvement in such matters should not be disregarded." 91 Therefore,
although disagreeing with the district court's rationale in dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction, the court of appeals affirmed the dis-
missal for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted.
B. Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of
whether the PKPA "furnishes an implied cause of action in federal
court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is
valid."92 In a unanimous decision, with concurrences by Justices
O'Connor and Scalia, the Court affirmed the holding of the court of
appeals. 93
After setting forth the relevant provisions of the PKPA and the
facts of the case, the Court addressed whether a federal cause of ac-
tion could be inferred from the Act.94 The Court stated that the
main inquiry must be whether Congress intended to create an im-
plied federal cause of action. 95 To ascertain intent, the majority re-
lied on the "four factors set out in Cort v. Ash 96... along with other
tools of statutory construction." 97
Although the Court acknowledged the applicability of the Cort
test, it never expressly enumerated the four factors, nor did it ex-
plain how Cort has been modified by later decisions. In Cort, the ma-
jority listed four inquiries requisite to determining if an implied
private remedy is available under a federal statute:
First .... does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? .. .Third, is it consistent with the un-
derlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 9 8
These four factors have been interpreted as merely relevant in deter-
91. Id at 1559.
92. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 514 (1988). Justice Marshall delivered
the opinion of the Court. Conspicuously absent from the Court's opinion is the ac-
knowledgment that the circuits were split with regard to this issue.
93. Id. at 516.
94. Id. at 514-16. The Court did note that "the legislative scheme suggests, and as
Congress explicitly specified, one of the chief purposes of the PKPA is to 'avoid juris-
dictional competition and conflict between State courts.'" Id at 515.
95. Id. at 516.
96. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
97. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 516. Although the court of appeals did not specify it
was using a Cort analysis, the format of the Supreme Court's opinion follows that set
up by the court of appeals. See Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1552-58 (9th
Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
98. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted) (holding that a stock-
holder's derivative suit cannot be implied in the federal courts under 18 U.S.C. § 610).
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mining whether a private remedy should be implied, with the central
inquiry being "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly
or by implication, a private cause of action."99 Furthermore, the
other "three factors discussed in Cort-the language and focus of the
statute, its legislative history, and its purpose... are ones tradition-
ally relied upon in determining legislative intent." 0 0 Nevertheless,
the four factors of Cort still remain the "criteria through which [leg-
islative] intent could be discerned,"10 ' even if the main inquiry is
whether Congress intended to create such a cause of action.'0 2 Based
on Cort and its progeny, Justice Marshall acknowledged that the in-
tent of Congress to create a cause of action, absent specific language,
must be inferred. 0 3
The Court first examined the "context of the PKPA with an eye
toward determining Congress' perception of the law that it was shap-
ing or reshaping."10 4 Even though the Court did not determine
whether child "custody orders were sufficiently 'final' to trigger full
faith and credit requirements," 05 it did note that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause only requires states to give the same effect to judg-
ments of other states as would be given in the state which entered
the decree. 0 6 Thus, a child custody award could be modified by any
state because the state which entered the decree retained that right.
99. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (holding no implied
private cause of action available under section 12(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
100. 1d. at 575-76.
101. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (19,79) (holding an implied cause of action
in the federal courts is not created under the Constitution when a violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment is alleged).
102. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (private action not implied by
violation of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899); see also
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1983).
[O]ur focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in
question .... That intent may in turn be discerned by examining a number of
factors, including the legislative history and purposes of the statute, the iden-
tity of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was passed, the exist-
ence of express statutory remedies adequate to serve the legislative purpose,
and the traditional role of the States in affording the relief claimed.
464 U.S. at 536.
103. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 516 (1988); see Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). "Such an intent may appear implicitly in
the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment." Id.
104. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 516.
105. Id. Thus, the Court acted in accordance with the prior cases of Halvey, Kovacs
and Ford in refraining from making a determination of the applicability of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to custody cases. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying
text.
106. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 517. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
As a result, many parents who lost in one state were "rewarded" for
snatching the child by being able to relitigate the claim in another fo-
rum.107 Justice Marshall, after outlining the unique problems in-
volved in child custody cases, glossed over the ineffectiveness of the
UCCJA in providing an adequate solution. Indeed, the failure of the
UCCJA led to the enactment of the PKPA.108
The Court concluded that the context of the PKPA "suggests that
the principal problem Congress was seeking to remedy was the inap-
plicability of full faith and credit requirements to custody determina-
tions."109 The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not create an
implied federal cause of action but, rather, demarcates the extent to
which one state is to be guided by another state's acts, records, and
judicial proceedings.110 The purpose and context of the PKPA there-
fore does not imply a cause of action "[b]ecause Congress' chief aim
in enacting the PKPA was to extend the requirements of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to custody determinations .... M
Justice Marshall then turned to the language and placement of the
statute. Because the PKPA was an addendum to the full faith and
credit statute,"i 2 the intent of Congress in enacting the PKPA must
have been that it should have the same effect as that statute.1 1 3 Fur-
thermore, the language of the Act is expressly directed toward the
states, without mentioning the role of the federal government. i 14
Thus, due to these factors, the Court could not infer a cause of
action.11 5
Finally, Justice Marshall looked at two passages in the legislative
107. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 517.
108. Id While the majority did state that "[t]he UCCJA prescribed uniform stan-
dards for deciding which State could make a custody determination and obligated en-
acting States to enforce the determination made by the State with proper jurisdiction,"
the Court failed to discuss the relevant provisions of the UCCJA after which much of
the PKPA is patterned. Id. See supra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
109. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 517. The Full Faith and Credit Clause:
only prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided
when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to the faith and
credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records, and judicial proceed-
ings of a state other than that in which the court is sitting.
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904).
110. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 518.
111. Id.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
113. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 518. Congress's intent to create merely a full faith and
credit obligation can be inferred from the placement of the statute after the full faith
and credit statute as an addendum. In fact, the heading of the PKPA is "Full faith and
credit given to child custody determinations." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
114. Section 1738A(a) of the PKPA states: "The appropriate authorities of every
State shall enforce according to its terms ... any child custody determination made
consistantly with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(a) (1982). Furthermore, the PKPA contains repeated references to the states.
115. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 518.
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history which he believed provided unusually conclusive evidence
that Congress did not intend the PKPA to be enforced in the federal
courts.1 1 6 These passages involve the exchange between Congress-
men Fish and Conyers, which the court of appeals examined,1 7 and a
letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to the Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee.11s Based on these two pieces
of legislative history, the Court concluded that the enforcement of
the provisions of the PKPA in federal court was rejected in favor of a
full faith and credit approach to be exercised by the states."19
The Court also addressed petitioner's argument that he was only
seeking a federal court determination as to which of two conflicting
states has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.120 Petitioner argued
that the federal courts did not have to reach a decision on the merits
of the case.1 2 ' In a footnote, Justice Marshall rejected this argument
because determining jurisdiction under the PKPA could require the
resolution of a substantive issue.1 22
Therefore, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision be-
cause the "context, language, and history of the PKPA together
make out a conclusive case against inferring a cause of action in fed-
eral court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees
is valid."123 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that while the Full
Faith and Credit Clause has been extended to encompass child cus-
116. Id.
117. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1557-58 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
513 (1988). See supra note 92. The Supreme Court argued that even though Congress-
man Fish wanted to create an exception for the $10,000 diversity requirement, the poli-
cies that were enunciated in the "colloquy" equally applied to the argument that
Congress did not intend the federal courts to enforce the PKPA. Thompson, 108 S. Ct.
at 519.
118. The Wald letter specified a number of paths Congress could take to solve the
problem of parental child snatching, including enforcement in a federal forum and the
full faith and credit approach which was subsequently codified. See PKPA Addendum,
supra note 23.
119. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 519-20.
120. Id. at 519. Petitioner thus did not ask the Court to determine whether one
state acted in compliance with the Act's jurisdictional requirements when no other
state asserted concurrent jurisdiction over the matter, and therefore there was no
conflict.
121. Id. at 520 n.4.
122. Id. "Under the Act, jurisdiction can turn on the child's 'best interest' or on
proof that the child has been abandoned or abused." Id. Marshall fails to acknowl-
edge, however, that "if two states concurrently render custody decrees, one state has
asserted jurisdiction in violation of federal law [and that] [i]dentifying that errant state
under § 1738A requires only preliminary inquiry into jurisdictional facts." Flood v.
Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1984).
123. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 520.
tody cases, it is up to the states sua sponte to enforce the provisions
of the PKPA. Finally, it noted that if Congress wanted to create a
cause of action in the federal courts, then it could do so expressly.124
C. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia in the first part of his concurring opinion, joined by
Justice O'Conner, pointed out several flaws in the Court's analysis.
First, he disagreed with the Court's statement that members of Con-
gress need not actually have in mind the creation of a private cause
of action in order for there to exist evidence of intent.125 Scalia be-
lieved that intent meant "that Congress had in mind the creation of a
private right of action."126 Scalia also believed that the Court's reli-
ance on Cort was misplaced since later cases have converted "one of
its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor,
with the other three merely indicative of its presence or absence."'127
Even though Scalia argued that Cort was overruled by later cases, 2 8
he misread those later decisions. While the focus of the Court may
be on intent, the factors enunciated in Cort are still indicative of that
intent. 2 9 As such, Cort has not been overruled, but has merely been
limited.
Justice Scalia further argued that "the 'context' of the enactment
is immaterial.' '130 Context has been relevant in the past only when
the statutory language is similar to or the same as the prior legisla-
tion. 3 1 Yet, Scalia ignores the fact that "context" may be relevant in
order to interpret legislative purpose and history, especially in the
present case since the PKPA is based on the UCCJA. Thus, while
context alone will not suffice, it is not accurate to say context is
immaterial.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court made the following statement
with which Scalia disagrees: "Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we
require evidence that members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in
mind the creation of a private cause of action." Id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. Id at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S.
560, 575-76 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18
(1979).
129. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
130. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 353-
54 (1982) (indicating a party may maintain an action for damages caused by a violation
of the Commodity Exchange Act since the 1974 amendment left intact the provisions
under which the federal courts had an implied cause of action); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979). In Cannon, the Court held that a suit can be
maintained under Title 18 of the Education Amendments of 1972, absent express au-
thorization, since the Act was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and was assumed to be interpreted in the same manner. Id
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A point of emphasis with which Justice Scalia concluded the first
part of his concurrence is the fact that implied federal causes of ac-
tion are very difficult to establish.13 2 He thus pointed out "that the
congressional intent test for implying private rights of action as it has
evolved since... Cort v. Ash is much more stringent than the Court's
dicta in the present case suggest."13 3
In the second part of his concurrence, Scalia argues, as a matter of
policy, that the judiciary should not imply federal causes of action.134
The process by which a bill becomes law, although not free from er-
rors, gives the lawmakers a sufficient opportunity to decide whether
or not a federal cause of action should be part of the law. If the judi-
ciary examines "intent," it assumes that all those engaged in lawmak-
ing have the same intent. This increases the risk that the judges
might be influenced by their own personal beliefs.135 Out of fear of
hindering the constitutionally mandated process for enacting laws,
Scalia believes that "a flat rule that private rights of action will not
be implied in statutes"1 3 6 should be adopted by the Court.
IV. IMPACT
In Thompson, the Court properly held that the provisions of the
PKPA cannot be enforced in the federal courts when two states exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction. As the Court points out, the context,
language, and history of the PKPA suggest that Congress intended to
extend only the full faith and credit statute.137 Congress merely
wanted to remedy the historical problems encountered in child cus-
tody matters by creating a federal obligation upon the states to recog-
nize, enforce and give deference to child custody decrees entered by
another state. Therefore, the court of appeals noted that since no
court has held "the Full Faith and Credit Clause or its implementing
statute, section 1738, authorized private suit in federal district court
to require a state court to give full faith and credit to the judgment of
132. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 521-22 (Scalia, J., concurring). "In the 23 years since
Justice Clark's opinion for the court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), we
have twice narrowed the test for implying a private right .... Id. at 522 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id. (Scalia, J.; concurring). "[A]s the likelihood that Congress would leave the
matter to implication decreases, so does the justification for bearing the risk of dis-
torting the constitutional process." Id. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
137. See supra notes 106-121 and accompanying text.
a court of another state,"1 38 then the PKPA, as an extension of the
full faith and credit obligation to the unique circumstances of child
custody cases, should not be construed to require more.139
The broader question, though, is whether the effectiveness of the
PKPA is limited by not inferring such a cause of action in the federal
courts. Even though a situation might arise, such as in Thompson,
where one state assumes jurisdiction improperly under the PKPA,140
the Court did note that "ultimate review remains available in this
Court for truly intractable jurisdictional deadocks."141 In other
words, "[ilf a state court refuses to honor the decision of a court of
another state, review may ultimately be sought in the Supreme Court
since a federal question is raised: the meaning of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. ... "142
The reason the Court in Thompson did not invoke this type of re-
view is that the petitioner did not exhaust all avenues of relief in the
state courts. That is, he sought "to have a California District Court
enjoin enforcement of a Louisiana state-court judgment before the
intermediate and supreme courts of Louisiana even have had an op-
portunity to review that judgment."143 Thus, if petitioner had ap-
pealed the judgment through the Louisiana state court system,
without success, he could have appealed to the Supreme Court.
To argue, as petitioner did, that not allowing the PKPA to be en-
forced in the federal courts would destroy its effectiveness places lit-
tle faith in the state court systems. The Court in Thompson notes
that "[s]tate courts faithfully administer the Full Faith and Credit
Clause every day; now that Congress has extended full faith and
credit requirements to child custody orders . . . [there is] no reason
why the courts' administration of federal law in custody disputes will
be any less vigilant."144 Despite the historical problems associated
138. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1555-56 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
513 (1988).
139. Id. at 1556.
It seems highly unlikely Congress would follow the pattern of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and section 1738 by structuring section 1738A as a com-
mand to state courts to give full faith and credit to the child custody decrees
of other states, and yet, without comment, depart from the enforcement prac-
tice followed under the Clause and section 1738.
Id.
140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
141. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 520 (1988).
142. Thompson, 798 F.2d at 1556 n.15. In Flood, the court suggests that this ap-
proach may be impractical due to the lack of time and resources of the modern-day
Supreme Court. Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1984).
143. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 520 n.5; accord Flood, 727 F.2d at 312. "Litigants who
have exhausted their state remedies could appeal directly to the United States
Supreme Court from the state supreme court that they contend has violated § 1738A."
Id.
144. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 520. The Court fails to acknowledge the argument
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with according full faith and credit to child custody decrees, Congress
extended that obligation into this area and provided that another
state cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction. The states, assuming
that the decree-entering state maintains jurisdiction pursuant to the
Act, must accord the same faith and credit to child custody cases as
they would under any other type of matter.
Yet, if the state courts do not adhere to the PKPA, Congress may
then choose to revisit the issue.145 In other words, if the PKPA does
not appear to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of conflicting
custody decrees, it is the legislature's function to supply a new course
of action. The Supreme Court 'does not wish to engage in judicial leg-
islation.146" "Congress alone has the responsibility for determining
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. . . .When Congress
chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should
not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and thereby
enlarge their jurisdiction."'147 Absent clear and convincing evidence
that Congress intended to create a federal cause of action, the Court
will not imply one.
The present Court, however, is not prepared to adopt Justice
Scalia's position that a federal cause of action will be implied only if
Congress expressly provides for such an action. The Court, in
Thompson, expressed its willingness to examine the context, lan-
guage and legislative history of a statute to determine whether Con-
gress intended the federal courts to be an available forum. If the
intent can be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances, the
Court may "imply" this type of action.
Justice Scalia's argument is not without merit. It is hard to believe
that a law could emerge from the cumbersome legislative process
without including such a vital provision as whether the federal courts
are available to enforce the law's provisions.148 Furthermore, since
that the purposes of the PKPA would be destroyed if the federal courts are not al-
lowed to resolve the disputes which might arise between the states. This was the un-
derlying rationale of the Eleventh, Fifth and Third Circuits. See supra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text.
145. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (indicating Court "will
not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not in-
tend to provide").
146. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. Id. See supra note 133.
148. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia commented,
"A legislative act so significant, and so separable from the remainder of the statute, as
the creation of a private right of action seems to me so implausibly left to implication
that the risk should not be endured." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
the Court has affirmatively stated its reluctance to imply causes of
action, Congress is likely to expressly include such a provision when
it intends to create a federal cause of action. 149
If the PKPA proves to be unworkable by states' unwillingness to
substantially adhere to the Act, Congress will have to reexamine the
problem. However, the legislative solution must not go beyond that
which is necessary. Thus, it would be unnecessary for the federal
courts to be granted jurisdiction in order to render a custody decision
on the merits in the first instance. Congress would only have to pro-
vide the federal courts with jurisdiction to determine "whether a
state has improperly taken jurisdiction under § 1738A [and] need not
implicate a federal court in questions of 'changed circumstances' and
modifiability."150 Until such time as the PKPA does not resolve the
jurisdictional dilemma of child custody cases, the federal government
would be best advised to abstain from the matter in order to give the
states an opportunity to successfully interpret and apply the PKPA
in a manner consistent with its provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The PKPA was created to remedy the unique jurisdictional
problems encountered in child custody cases. Congress, by imple-
menting this statute, intended to impose a federal duty on the state
to not exercise concurrent jurisdiction over child custody cases and to
recognize the child custody awards of another jurisdiction. The
PKPA is not a statute which was written to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts; rather, it was written to establish uniform standards
for determining which state has jurisdiction over a child custody case
and to eliminate the historical problem of forum shopping by a par-
ent seeking to obtain a favorable judgment. Hopefully, the parents
and states involved will consider the "best interests" of the child, and
will not require Congress to revisit the issue in the future.
STEVEN M. SCHUETZE
149. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1984).
